Does the law contain implicit exceptions to its own rules? If so, what consequence does that have for understanding the relationship between law and morality? This collection gathers leading legal philosophers to analyse the logical structure of legal norms, advancing the understanding of the general philosophy of law.
the mental process of reasoning with legal, or legally relevant, data, to get to legal conclusions. From this perspective, legal reasoning is defeasible, not for its being 'legal', i.e. due to some peculiarity of the law-world, ...
The study presented in this book was entered upon by me from a legal point of view. 'Legal logic' has been known for a long time, concerning itself with the methodology of legal and in particular judicial reasoning. In modern days, however, this 'legal logic' is sometimes also connected with modern formal logic, as it has been developed in the works of G. Boole, A. de Morgan, G. Frege, C.S. Peirce, E. Schroder, G. Peano, A.N. Whitehead, B. Russell and others. For me this gave rise to the as yet not very specific question about the meaning of modern symbolic logic for law. Already in an early stage it appeared that, although traditional legal logic and modern symbolic logic both concern logic, this may not create the misapprehension that a similar matter is at issue. Both concern themselves (among other things) with reasonings and reasoning. Traditional legal logic is, however, as it was said by the German legal theoretician K. Engisch: "a material logic that wants us to reflect on what we have to do if we -within the limits of actual possibility- wish to reach true, or at least correct judgements" (Engisch, 1964, p.5). Modern symbolic logic on the other hand is not concerned with the truth or correctness of the result of an argument, but with its validity, i.e. the question when or under which conditions the truth (correctness) of the conclusion is guaranteed by the truth (correctness) of the premisses.
The study presented in this book was entered upon by me from a legal point of view.
This book presents the current state of the art regarding the application of logical tools to the problems of theory and practice of lawmaking. It shows how contemporary logic may be useful in the analysis of legislation, legislative drafting and legal reasoning concerning different contexts of law making. Elaborations of the process of law making have variously emphasised its political, social or economic aspects. Yet despite strong interest in logical analyses of law, questions remains about the role of logical tools in law making. This volume attempts to bridge that gap, or at least to narrow it, drawing together some important research problems—and some possible solutions—as seen through the work of leading contemporary academics. The volume encompasses 20 chapters written by authors from 16 countries and it presents diversified views on the understanding of logic (from strict mathematical approaches to the informal, argumentative ones) and differentiated choices concerning the aspects of law making taken into account. The book presents a broad set of perspectives, insights and results into the emerging field of research devoted to the logical analysis of the area of creation of law. How does logic inform lawmaking? Are legal systems consistent and complete? How can legal rules be represented by means of formal calculi and visualization techniques? Does the structure of statutes or of legal systems resemble the structure of deductive systems? What are the logical relations between the basic concepts of jurisprudence that constitute the system of law? How are theories of legal interpretation relevant to the process of legislation? How might the statutory text be analysed by means of contemporary computer programs? These and other questions, ranging from the theoretical to the immediately practical, are addressed in this definitive collection.
Legal reasoning is “pragmatic” in at least three senses. First, the ultimate subject matter of such reasoning is decision–making leading to governmental action. The ultimate focus on whether or not to engage in some action gives the ...
Have you ever read a legal opinion and come across an odd term like the fallacy of denying the antecedent, the fallacy of the undistributed middle, or the fallacy of the illicit process and wondered how you missed that in law school? You’re not alone: every day, lawyers make arguments that fatally trespass the rules of formal logic—without realizing it—because traditional legal education often overlooks imparting the practical wisdom of ancient philosophy as it teaches students how to “think like a lawyer.” In his book, The Force of Logic: Using Formal Logic as a Tool in the Craft of Legal Argument, lawyer and law professor Stephen M. Rice guides you to develop your powers of legal reasoning in a new way, through effective tips and tactics that will forever change the way you argue your cases. Rice contends that formal logic provides tools that help lawyers distinguish good arguments from bad ones and, moreover, that they are simple to learn and use. When you know how to recognize logical fallacies, you will not only strengthen your own arguments, but you will also be able to punch holes in your opponent’s—and that can make the difference between winning and losing. In this book, Rice builds on the theoretical foundation of formal logic by demonstrating logical fallacies through the use of anecdotes, examples, graphical illustrations, and exercises for you to try that are derived from common case documents. It is a hands-on primer that presents a practical approach for understanding and mastering the place of formal logic in the art of legal reasoning. Whether you are a lawyer, a judge, a scholar, or a student, The Force of Logic will inspire you to love legal argument, and appreciate its beauty and complexity in a brand new way.
In this book, Rice builds on the theoretical foundation of formal logic by demonstrating logical fallacies through the use of anecdotes, examples, graphical illustrations, and exercises for you to try that are derived from common case ...
This solidly written book explains the elements of contemporary symbolic logic, and examines the ways in which it illuminates the structure of legal reasoning and clarifies various legal problems. Offering a clear and succinct presentation of standard propositional and predicate logic, it presents the elements of standard logic and applies those techniques to legal materials. It covers the use of standard logic in legal argument, including the denial or distinguishing of premises and the rules of pleading, and makes extensive use of legal materials, cases and statutes, in both examples and exercises. Readers are also given strategies for handling major legal problems in standard logic, including ways for treating conditions contrary to fact, necessary and sufficient conditions, result within the risk, and intent. For logicians and philosophers of law.
This solidly written book explains the elements of contemporary symbolic logic, and examines the ways in which it illuminates the structure of legal reasoning and clarifies various legal problems.
This book is an adaptation of my PhD thesis Representing L3gVI Rules in Deontic Logic [Royakkers, 1996]. The main alterations are: • The addition of chapter 2 concerning the semantics of deontic logic based on valua tions. In this chapter I extend the Beth tableau method, which is originally developed for the propositional calculus, to also be applicable for deontic logic. For those who are not familiar with deontic logic or with the axiomatic deduction, this method is a useful tool to check whether a formula is valid or not. • The addition of the notion of commitment in chapter 5, and the notion of weak and strong permission in chapter 7. • The omission of the chapter concerning defeasible deontic logic, of which a revised version is published in [Nute, 1997]. • Chapter 6 has been revised rather thoroughly. Here I introduce the logic of enact ment based on epistemic logic and local reasoning to express normative inconsis tencies in a consistent way. I wish to thank John-Jules Meyer, Giovanni Sartor and Marek Sergot for their suggestions and criticisms of my PhD thesis, which have improved this book. Heleen Neggers and Jan Draisma deserve credit for the layout. Special thanks go to Frank Dignum for his continuous support and inspiring sugges tions. v Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Logic and law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 1 . . . 1.2 Conflicting speed limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 3 . .
This book describes extensions of deontic logic.
This book describes extensions of deontic logic. Deontic logic is a branch of philosophical logic involving reasoning with norms, obligations, prohibitions and permissions. The extensions concern the logical structure of legal rules and legal reasoning. Their function is to improve the representation of legal knowledge and enhance deontic logic through increased expressibility. The resulting formulas acquire new meanings, not expressible in standard deontic logic, which are subject to fresh interpretations. The author offers an extensive analysis of the representation of actors, to whom the norms are directed, and authorities who enact the norms. Moreover, a distinction is made between enactment and applicability. A modality of enactment can be used to express inconsistent enacted norms in a consistent way. An authority-hierarchy is introduced to filter out the applicable norms from the set of enacted norms. Some related philosophical questions will be discussed regarding the applications of formalisms that are intrinsic to practical science with respect to `consistency' and `universality'. The formalisms and applications considered here are relevant for law, philosophy and computer science, with a special focus on the improvement of legal expert systems and intelligent support for legal professionals.
This book describes extensions of deontic logic.
Legal rules ought to work themselves out, with unique or difficult cases becoming fewer, and the inconsistencies in the system disappearing as they are confronted. Instead, legal doctrine and the role of judges has become more difficult and often more controversial. This book offers a general explanation why, and in so doing, analyzes how individuals reason when they behave as judges. Drawing on ideas from philosophical logic, game theory, philosophy of mind, truth theory, and jurisprudence, the author develops a theory of judicial pluralism which suggests that judicial truth is individually objective but societally personal, pluralistic and idiosyncratic.
Instead, legal doctrine and the role of judges has become more difficult and often more controversial. This book offers a general explanation why, and in so doing, analyzes how individuals reason when they behave as judges.
The substance of this book is derived from lectures presented to working paralegals as the first in a series of "foundation courses" intended to supplement their prior education and experience and to enhance their capacity to more competently handle tasks normally handled by lawyers. The course, and this book, is a condensed version of a full semester course in Aristotelian logic, tailored to the needs of people engaged in the analysis of legal issues, either as employee or as student. There are several primary objectives. the first is not to create logicians, but to foster the students' awareness of their own reasoning processes by discussing the importance of words, their definitions, uses and relationships, and to provide tools for testing whether conclusions are valid or invalid using formal (logical) analysis. The second broader objective is to provide a foundation for further study and use of the principles of effective communication and interpretation of communication. Another more specific objective is to show the use of the tools of logic in a legal context, particularly the formal analysis of case law. About the author: The author has practiced law since 1967. During his tenure as Counsel with a major financial services corporation, he was responsible for its law department's paralegals and paralegal development program. Those duties led him to develop the three foundation courses that are now available in book and digital form: Legal Logic, Legal Promise, and Legal Method.
The substance of this book is derived from lectures presented to working paralegals as the first in a series of "foundation courses" intended to supplement their prior education and experience and to enhance their capacity to more ...
