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A Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems

The Reach of Abduction: Insight and Trial

The present work is a continuation of the authors' acclaimed multi-volume A Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems. After having investigated the notion of relevance in their previous volume, Gabbay and Woods now turn to abduction. In this highly original approach, abduction is construed as ignorance-preserving inference, in which conjecture plays a pivotal role. Abduction is a response to a cognitive target that cannot be hit on the basis of what the agent currently knows. The abducer selects a hypothesis which were it true would enable the reasoner to attain his target. He concludes from this fact that the hypothesis may be conjectured. In allowing conjecture to stand in for the knowledge he fails to have, the abducer reveals himself to be a satisficer, since an abductive solution is not a solution from knowledge. Key to the authors' analysis is the requirement that a conjectured proposition is not just what a reasoner might allow himself to assume, but a proposition he must defeasibly release as a premiss for further inferences in the domain of enquiry in which the original abduction problem has arisen. The coverage of the book is extensive, from the philosophy of science to computer science and AI, from diagnostics to the law, from historical explanation to linguistic interpretation. One of the volume's strongest contributions is its exploration of the abductive character of criminal trials, with special attention given to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Underlying their analysis of abductive reasoning is the authors' conception of practical agency. In this approach, practical agency is dominantly a matter of the comparative modesty of an agent's cognitive agendas, together with comparatively scant resources available for their advancement. Seen in these ways, abduction has a significantly practical character, precisely because it is a form of inference that satisfices rather than maximizes its response to the agent's cognitive target. The Reach of Abduction will be necessary reading for researchers, graduate students and senior undergraduates in logic, computer science, AI, belief dynamics, argumentation theory, cognitive psychology and neuroscience, linguistics, forensic science, legal reasoning and related areas. Key features: - Reach of Abduction is fully integrated with a background logic of cognitive systems. - The most extensive coverage compared to competitive works. - Demonstrates not only that abduction is a form of ignorance preserving inference but that it is a mode of inference that is wholly rational. - Demonstrates the satisficing rather than maximizing character of abduction. - The development of formal models of abduction is considerably more extensive than one finds in existing literature. It is an especially impressive amalgam of sophisticated conceptual analysis and extensive logical modelling. · Reach of Abduction is fully integrated with a background logic of cognitive systems. · The most extensive coverage compared to competitive works · Demonstrates not only that abduction is a form of ignorance preserving inference but that it is a mode of inference that is wholly rational. · Demonstrates the satisficing rather than maximizing character of abduction. · The development of formal models of abduction is considerably more extensive than one finds in existing literature. It is an especially impressive amalgam of sophisticated conceptual analysis and extensive logical modelling.

The present work is a continuation of the authors' acclaimed multi-volume A Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems. After having investigated the notion of relevance in their previous volume, Gabbay and Woods now turn to abduction.

Norms, Logics and Information Systems

New Studies in Deontic Logic and Computer Science

This book presents research in an interdisciplinary field, resulting from the vigorous and fruitful cross-pollination between traditional deontic logic and computer science. AI researchers have used deontic logic as one of the tools in modelling legal reasoning. Computer scientists have discovered that computer systems (including their interaction with other computer systems and with human agents) can often be productively modelled as norm-governed. So, for example, deontic logic has been applied by computer scientists for specifying bureaucratic systems, access and security policies, and soft design or integrity constraints, and for modelling fault tolerance. In turn, computer scientists and AI researchers have also discovered (and made it clear to the rest of us) that various formal tools (e.g. nonmonotonic, temporal and dynamic logics) developed in computer science and artificial intelligence have interesting applications to traditional issues in deontic logic. This volume presents some of the best work done in this area, with the selection at once reflecting the general interdisciplinary (and international) character that this area of research has taken on, as well as reflecting the more specific recent inter-disciplinary developments between traditional deontic logic and computer science.

This book presents research in an interdisciplinary field, resulting from the vigorous and fruitful cross-pollination between traditional deontic logic and computer science.

Every-day Reasoning, Or, The Science of Inductive Logic

Law , 115 . Dew , Well's theory of , 79 . Difference , method of , 58 . Rule of , 61 . Basis of , 63 . Arguments from answered , 166 . Difficulties of identifying causes , 42 . Direct proof , 165 . Documents interpret themselves , 156 .

Aristotle's Logic of Education

In <I>Aristotle's Logic of Education, Richard Bauman makes a contribution to both the history of logic and the philosophy of education. He argues that Aristotle, in the course of laying out his system of syllogistic inference, intends to guide the way science is taught, rather than how scientific research is conducted. The teacher is supposed to proceed by the method of demonstration from the appropriate necessary premises. Dr. Bauman contends that the problems raised in Plato's <I>Meno form the background for understanding Aristotle's presentation of logic in his <I>Posterior Analytics. In light of Bauman's interpretation, a fresh approach should be taken to the recurrent claim that syllogistic reasoning always involves committing the fallacy of <I>petitio principii. Finally, the author criticizes Aristotle's attempt to reduce both reasoning and teaching to singular patterns. In particular, Bauman argues that Aristotle fails to account adequately for the acquisition of first principles.

In Aristotle's Logic of Education, Richard Bauman makes a contribution to both the history of logic and the philosophy of education.

New Developments in Legal Reasoning and Logic

From Ancient Law to Modern Legal Systems

This book intends to unite studies in different fields related to the development of the relations between logic, law and legal reasoning. Combining historical and philosophical studies on legal reasoning in Civil and Common Law, and on the often neglected Arabic and Talmudic traditions of jurisprudence, this project unites these areas with recent technical developments in computer science. This combination has resulted in renewed interest in deontic logic and logic of norms that stems from the interaction between artificial intelligence and law and their applications to these areas of logic. The book also aims to motivate and launch a more intense interaction between the historical and philosophical work of Arabic, Talmudic and European jurisprudence. The publication discusses new insights in the interaction between logic and law, and more precisely the study of different answers to the question: what role does logic play in legal reasoning? Varying perspectives include that of foundational studies (such as logical principles and frameworks) to applications, and historical perspectives.

He also, however, introduces a counter-continuum, in which blind traditionalism leads to legal uniformity. 5.3 Conclusion Independent legal reasoning is a pivotal aspect of the conceptual genealogy of legal reasoning in the Jewish legal ...

Past and Present Interactions in Legal Reasoning and Logic

This volume explores the relation between legal reasoning and logic from both a historical and a systematic perspective. The topics addressed include, among others, conditional legal acts, disjunctions in legal acts, presumptions and conjectures, conflicts of values, Jørgensen ́s Dilemma, the Rhetor ́s Dilemma, the theory of legal fictions and the categorization of contracts. The unifying problematic of these contributions concerns the conditional structures and, more particularly, the relationship between legal theory and legal reasoning in the context of conditions. The contributions in this work constitute the first results of the ANR-DFG joint research project “JuriLog” (Jurisprudence and Logic), which aims at fostering the cooperation between legal scholars and philosophers. On the one hand, lawyers and legal scholars have an interest in emphasizing the logical character of legal reasoning. In this respect, the present enquiry examines the question of how logic, especially newer forms of dialogical logic, can be made fruitful as a significant area of philosophy for jurisprudence and legal practice. On the other hand, logicians find in legal reasoning a striving towards clear definitions and inference-procedures that is relevant to their discipline. In order to fully understand such reciprocal relationships, it is necessary to bridge the gap between law, logic and philosophy in contemporary academic research. The essays collected in this volume all work towards this common goal. The book is divided in three sections. In the first part, the strong relation between Roman Law and logic is explored with respect to the analysis of disjunctive statements in legal acts. The second part focuses on Leibniz ́s legal theory. The third part, finally, is dedicated to current interactions between law and logic.

Not only this framework allows us to respect the methodological abyss pointed out by Kelsen, but it also displays the interactions which are inherent to the legal reasoning. Our attempts are particularly directed to aspects concerning ...

The Use of Logic in Legal Reasoning

If the judge were , like a pure logician , to analyse all the possible alternative paths of justification , he might ... argued that there may be a difference in kind between " logically closed ” and “ logically open ” legal orders .

Studies in Legal Logic

Studies in Legal Logic is a collection of nine interrelated papers about the logic, epistemology and ontology of law. All of the papers were written after the publication of the author’s Reasoning with Rules and supplement the issues addressed therein. Some of the papers are new; others have been revised substantially after the publication of their original versions. The emphasis is on analysis, not on logical technicalities. Studies in Legal Logic contains chapters about the nature of norms, the role of coherence in the law, the nature of defeasibility, the role of dialectics in law and artificial intelligence, the statics and dynamics of the law, and the consistency of rules. Moreover, it contains a new, simplified and yet more powerful version of Reason-based Logic and extensive examples of how it can be used for the analysis of legal reasoning. The examples deal with legal theory construction, case-based reasoning, and judicial proof.

kinds of defeasibility, namely ontological, conceptual, epistemic, justification, and logical defeasibility. The second step is to investigate whether the law, legal knowledge, legal reasoning, or legal justification, is defeasible in ...

Law and Logic

A Critical Account of Legal Argument

This book has two related aims: to investigate the frequently voiced claim that legal argument is nonformal in nature and, within the limits of such an investigation, to ascertain the most general proper ties of law as a rational system. Examination of a number of views of legal argument, selected from recent discussions in Germany, Belgium, and the English-speaking countries, will lead to the follow ing main conclusions. The nonformalistic conceptions of the logic of legal argument are ambiguous and unclear. Moreover, insofar as these conceptions are capable of clarification in the light of recent analytical methodology, they can be seen to be either mistaken or else compatible with the formalistic position. Because law is socially directive and coordinative, it is dependent upon theoretical psycho sociology and calls, in principle, for a deontic and inductive logic. The primary function of legal argument is to provide continuing reinterpretation and confirmation of legal rules, conceived as theo retical prescriptions. On the basis of this conception, the old juris prudential conflict between formalism and rule-scepticism appears substantially resolved. Aristotle, the founder of the theory of argument, conceived it as "the science of establishing conclusions" (bnO'l;~fl'YJ &no~e!"u,,~), designed to guide people in rational argumentation. In time, how ever, logic forsook its practical function and developed as a highly abstract and disinterested study, today called "formal logic"; and the theory of practical argument was either neglected or relegated to an appendix to rhetoric.

This book has two related aims: to investigate the frequently voiced claim that legal argument is nonformal in nature and, within the limits of such an investigation, to ascertain the most general proper ties of law as a rational system.