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Logic Programming '86

Proceedings of the 5th Conference, Tokyo, Japan, June 23-26, 1986

This volume contains the papers presented, and subsequently submitted for publication, at the 5th Logic Programming Conference, held June 23-26, 1986 in Tokyo. Topics covered include Prolog machine architecture, Prolog processors, variations of Prolog language, and applications of Prolog to natural language understanding, and expert systems. Most of the works reported in the volume are related to the Japanese Fifth Generation Computer Project allowing readers to compare results from this project with those from similar projects currently being conducted in other countries.

LEGAL EXPERT SYSTEM LES - 2 H. Yoshino , S. Kagayama , S. Ohta , M. Kitahara , H. Kondoh , M. Nakakawaji ... It was the 1st version of this system and it was developed as a reasoning system for substantial law ( Japanese civil law ) .

Meta-Programming in Logic

Third International Workshop, META-92, Uppsala, Sweden, June 10-12, 1992. Proceedings

This volume contains lectures and papers delivered at Meta 92, the Third International Workshop on Metaprogramming in Logic, held in Uppsala, Sweden,June 1992. The topics covered include foundations of metaprogramming in logic, proposals for metaprogramming languages, techniques for knowledgerepresentation and belief systems, and program transformation and analysis in logic. Particular topics include belief revision systems, intensionaldeduction, belief systems and metaprogramming, principles of partial deduction, termination in logic programs, semantics of the "vanilla" metainterpreter, a complete resolution method for metaprogramming, semanticsof "demo", hierarchical metalogics, the naming relation in metalevel systems, modules, reflective agents, compiler optimizations, metalogic and object-oriented facilities, parallel logic languages, the use of metaprogramming for legal reasoning, representing objects and inheritance, transformation of normal programs, negation in automatically generated logic programs, reordering of literals in deductive databases, abstract interpretations, and interarguments in constraint logic programs.

This volume contains lectures and papers delivered at Meta 92, the Third International Workshop on Metaprogramming in Logic, held in Uppsala, Sweden,June 1992.

Deontic Logic, Agency and Normative Systems

?EON ’96: Third International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science, Sesimbra, Portugal, 11 – 13 January 1996

This volume presents a variety of papers bearing on the relation between deontic logics, logics of action, and normative systems, i.e. systems of or about interacting agents (computers, human beings, corporations, etc.) whose behaviour is subject to ideal constraints that may not always be fulfilled in practice. The papers range from theoretical studies of the logical and conceptual tools needed, to studies of various applications. The set of papers collected in this book should be of interest to investigators working in a variety of fields, from philosophy, logic and legal theory to artificial intelligence, computer and management sciences, since it covers topics ranging from theoretical research on foundational issues in deontic and action logics, defeasible reasoning, decision theory, ethical theory, and legal theory, to research on a variety of issues relevant to applications connected with expert systems in the law, document specification, automation of defeasible reasoning, specification of responsibilities and powers in organizations, normative systems specification, confidentiality in database systems, and a host of other applications.

This volume presents a variety of papers bearing on the relation between deontic logics, logics of action, and normative systems, i.e. systems of or about interacting agents (computers, human beings, corporations, etc.) whose behaviour is ...

New Developments in Legal Reasoning and Logic

From Ancient Law to Modern Legal Systems

This book intends to unite studies in different fields related to the development of the relations between logic, law and legal reasoning. Combining historical and philosophical studies on legal reasoning in Civil and Common Law, and on the often neglected Arabic and Talmudic traditions of jurisprudence, this project unites these areas with recent technical developments in computer science. This combination has resulted in renewed interest in deontic logic and logic of norms that stems from the interaction between artificial intelligence and law and their applications to these areas of logic. The book also aims to motivate and launch a more intense interaction between the historical and philosophical work of Arabic, Talmudic and European jurisprudence. The publication discusses new insights in the interaction between logic and law, and more precisely the study of different answers to the question: what role does logic play in legal reasoning? Varying perspectives include that of foundational studies (such as logical principles and frameworks) to applications, and historical perspectives.

He also, however, introduces a counter-continuum, in which blind traditionalism leads to legal uniformity. 5.3 Conclusion Independent legal reasoning is a pivotal aspect of the conceptual genealogy of legal reasoning in the Jewish legal ...

Past and Present Interactions in Legal Reasoning and Logic

This volume explores the relation between legal reasoning and logic from both a historical and a systematic perspective. The topics addressed include, among others, conditional legal acts, disjunctions in legal acts, presumptions and conjectures, conflicts of values, Jørgensen ́s Dilemma, the Rhetor ́s Dilemma, the theory of legal fictions and the categorization of contracts. The unifying problematic of these contributions concerns the conditional structures and, more particularly, the relationship between legal theory and legal reasoning in the context of conditions. The contributions in this work constitute the first results of the ANR-DFG joint research project “JuriLog” (Jurisprudence and Logic), which aims at fostering the cooperation between legal scholars and philosophers. On the one hand, lawyers and legal scholars have an interest in emphasizing the logical character of legal reasoning. In this respect, the present enquiry examines the question of how logic, especially newer forms of dialogical logic, can be made fruitful as a significant area of philosophy for jurisprudence and legal practice. On the other hand, logicians find in legal reasoning a striving towards clear definitions and inference-procedures that is relevant to their discipline. In order to fully understand such reciprocal relationships, it is necessary to bridge the gap between law, logic and philosophy in contemporary academic research. The essays collected in this volume all work towards this common goal. The book is divided in three sections. In the first part, the strong relation between Roman Law and logic is explored with respect to the analysis of disjunctive statements in legal acts. The second part focuses on Leibniz ́s legal theory. The third part, finally, is dedicated to current interactions between law and logic.

Not only this framework allows us to respect the methodological abyss pointed out by Kelsen, but it also displays the interactions which are inherent to the legal reasoning. Our attempts are particularly directed to aspects concerning ...

Studies in Legal Logic

Studies in Legal Logic is a collection of nine interrelated papers about the logic, epistemology and ontology of law. All of the papers were written after the publication of the author’s Reasoning with Rules and supplement the issues addressed therein. Some of the papers are new; others have been revised substantially after the publication of their original versions. The emphasis is on analysis, not on logical technicalities. Studies in Legal Logic contains chapters about the nature of norms, the role of coherence in the law, the nature of defeasibility, the role of dialectics in law and artificial intelligence, the statics and dynamics of the law, and the consistency of rules. Moreover, it contains a new, simplified and yet more powerful version of Reason-based Logic and extensive examples of how it can be used for the analysis of legal reasoning. The examples deal with legal theory construction, case-based reasoning, and judicial proof.

kinds of defeasibility, namely ontological, conceptual, epistemic, justification, and logical defeasibility. The second step is to investigate whether the law, legal knowledge, legal reasoning, or legal justification, is defeasible in ...

Law and Logic

A Critical Account of Legal Argument

This book has two related aims: to investigate the frequently voiced claim that legal argument is nonformal in nature and, within the limits of such an investigation, to ascertain the most general proper ties of law as a rational system. Examination of a number of views of legal argument, selected from recent discussions in Germany, Belgium, and the English-speaking countries, will lead to the follow ing main conclusions. The nonformalistic conceptions of the logic of legal argument are ambiguous and unclear. Moreover, insofar as these conceptions are capable of clarification in the light of recent analytical methodology, they can be seen to be either mistaken or else compatible with the formalistic position. Because law is socially directive and coordinative, it is dependent upon theoretical psycho sociology and calls, in principle, for a deontic and inductive logic. The primary function of legal argument is to provide continuing reinterpretation and confirmation of legal rules, conceived as theo retical prescriptions. On the basis of this conception, the old juris prudential conflict between formalism and rule-scepticism appears substantially resolved. Aristotle, the founder of the theory of argument, conceived it as "the science of establishing conclusions" (bnO'l;~fl'YJ &no~e!"u,,~), designed to guide people in rational argumentation. In time, how ever, logic forsook its practical function and developed as a highly abstract and disinterested study, today called "formal logic"; and the theory of practical argument was either neglected or relegated to an appendix to rhetoric.

This book has two related aims: to investigate the frequently voiced claim that legal argument is nonformal in nature and, within the limits of such an investigation, to ascertain the most general proper ties of law as a rational system.

Logic in Law

Remarks on Logic and Rationality in Normative Reasoning, Especially in Law

The study presented in this book was entered upon by me from a legal point of view. 'Legal logic' has been known for a long time, concerning itself with the methodology of legal and in particular judicial reasoning. In modern days, however, this 'legal logic' is sometimes also connected with modern formal logic, as it has been developed in the works of G. Boole, A. de Morgan, G. Frege, C.S. Peirce, E. Schroder, G. Peano, A.N. Whitehead, B. Russell and others. For me this gave rise to the as yet not very specific question about the meaning of modern symbolic logic for law. Already in an early stage it appeared that, although traditional legal logic and modern symbolic logic both concern logic, this may not create the misapprehension that a similar matter is at issue. Both concern themselves (among other things) with reasonings and reasoning. Traditional legal logic is, however, as it was said by the German legal theoretician K. Engisch: "a material logic that wants us to reflect on what we have to do if we -within the limits of actual possibility- wish to reach true, or at least correct judgements" (Engisch, 1964, p.5). Modern symbolic logic on the other hand is not concerned with the truth or correctness of the result of an argument, but with its validity, i.e. the question when or under which conditions the truth (correctness) of the conclusion is guaranteed by the truth (correctness) of the premisses.

The study presented in this book was entered upon by me from a legal point of view.

Logic in the Theory and Practice of Lawmaking

This book presents the current state of the art regarding the application of logical tools to the problems of theory and practice of lawmaking. It shows how contemporary logic may be useful in the analysis of legislation, legislative drafting and legal reasoning concerning different contexts of law making. Elaborations of the process of law making have variously emphasised its political, social or economic aspects. Yet despite strong interest in logical analyses of law, questions remains about the role of logical tools in law making. This volume attempts to bridge that gap, or at least to narrow it, drawing together some important research problems—and some possible solutions—as seen through the work of leading contemporary academics. The volume encompasses 20 chapters written by authors from 16 countries and it presents diversified views on the understanding of logic (from strict mathematical approaches to the informal, argumentative ones) and differentiated choices concerning the aspects of law making taken into account. The book presents a broad set of perspectives, insights and results into the emerging field of research devoted to the logical analysis of the area of creation of law. How does logic inform lawmaking? Are legal systems consistent and complete? How can legal rules be represented by means of formal calculi and visualization techniques? Does the structure of statutes or of legal systems resemble the structure of deductive systems? What are the logical relations between the basic concepts of jurisprudence that constitute the system of law? How are theories of legal interpretation relevant to the process of legislation? How might the statutory text be analysed by means of contemporary computer programs? These and other questions, ranging from the theoretical to the immediately practical, are addressed in this definitive collection.

Legal reasoning is “pragmatic” in at least three senses. First, the ultimate subject matter of such reasoning is decision–making leading to governmental action. The ultimate focus on whether or not to engage in some action gives the ...

Extending Deontic Logic for the Formalisation of Legal Rules

This book is an adaptation of my PhD thesis Representing L3gVI Rules in Deontic Logic [Royakkers, 1996]. The main alterations are: • The addition of chapter 2 concerning the semantics of deontic logic based on valua tions. In this chapter I extend the Beth tableau method, which is originally developed for the propositional calculus, to also be applicable for deontic logic. For those who are not familiar with deontic logic or with the axiomatic deduction, this method is a useful tool to check whether a formula is valid or not. • The addition of the notion of commitment in chapter 5, and the notion of weak and strong permission in chapter 7. • The omission of the chapter concerning defeasible deontic logic, of which a revised version is published in [Nute, 1997]. • Chapter 6 has been revised rather thoroughly. Here I introduce the logic of enact ment based on epistemic logic and local reasoning to express normative inconsis tencies in a consistent way. I wish to thank John-Jules Meyer, Giovanni Sartor and Marek Sergot for their suggestions and criticisms of my PhD thesis, which have improved this book. Heleen Neggers and Jan Draisma deserve credit for the layout. Special thanks go to Frank Dignum for his continuous support and inspiring sugges tions. v Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Logic and law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 1 . . . 1.2 Conflicting speed limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 3 . .

This book describes extensions of deontic logic.