This book presents the current state of the art regarding the application of logical tools to the problems of theory and practice of lawmaking. It shows how contemporary logic may be useful in the analysis of legislation, legislative drafting and legal reasoning concerning different contexts of law making. Elaborations of the process of law making have variously emphasised its political, social or economic aspects. Yet despite strong interest in logical analyses of law, questions remains about the role of logical tools in law making. This volume attempts to bridge that gap, or at least to narrow it, drawing together some important research problems—and some possible solutions—as seen through the work of leading contemporary academics. The volume encompasses 20 chapters written by authors from 16 countries and it presents diversified views on the understanding of logic (from strict mathematical approaches to the informal, argumentative ones) and differentiated choices concerning the aspects of law making taken into account. The book presents a broad set of perspectives, insights and results into the emerging field of research devoted to the logical analysis of the area of creation of law. How does logic inform lawmaking? Are legal systems consistent and complete? How can legal rules be represented by means of formal calculi and visualization techniques? Does the structure of statutes or of legal systems resemble the structure of deductive systems? What are the logical relations between the basic concepts of jurisprudence that constitute the system of law? How are theories of legal interpretation relevant to the process of legislation? How might the statutory text be analysed by means of contemporary computer programs? These and other questions, ranging from the theoretical to the immediately practical, are addressed in this definitive collection.
Legal reasoning is “pragmatic” in at least three senses. First, the ultimate subject matter of such reasoning is decision–making leading to governmental action. The ultimate focus on whether or not to engage in some action gives the ...
Have you ever read a legal opinion and come across an odd term like the fallacy of denying the antecedent, the fallacy of the undistributed middle, or the fallacy of the illicit process and wondered how you missed that in law school? You’re not alone: every day, lawyers make arguments that fatally trespass the rules of formal logic—without realizing it—because traditional legal education often overlooks imparting the practical wisdom of ancient philosophy as it teaches students how to “think like a lawyer.” In his book, The Force of Logic: Using Formal Logic as a Tool in the Craft of Legal Argument, lawyer and law professor Stephen M. Rice guides you to develop your powers of legal reasoning in a new way, through effective tips and tactics that will forever change the way you argue your cases. Rice contends that formal logic provides tools that help lawyers distinguish good arguments from bad ones and, moreover, that they are simple to learn and use. When you know how to recognize logical fallacies, you will not only strengthen your own arguments, but you will also be able to punch holes in your opponent’s—and that can make the difference between winning and losing. In this book, Rice builds on the theoretical foundation of formal logic by demonstrating logical fallacies through the use of anecdotes, examples, graphical illustrations, and exercises for you to try that are derived from common case documents. It is a hands-on primer that presents a practical approach for understanding and mastering the place of formal logic in the art of legal reasoning. Whether you are a lawyer, a judge, a scholar, or a student, The Force of Logic will inspire you to love legal argument, and appreciate its beauty and complexity in a brand new way.
In this book, Rice builds on the theoretical foundation of formal logic by demonstrating logical fallacies through the use of anecdotes, examples, graphical illustrations, and exercises for you to try that are derived from common case ...
This solidly written book explains the elements of contemporary symbolic logic, and examines the ways in which it illuminates the structure of legal reasoning and clarifies various legal problems. Offering a clear and succinct presentation of standard propositional and predicate logic, it presents the elements of standard logic and applies those techniques to legal materials. It covers the use of standard logic in legal argument, including the denial or distinguishing of premises and the rules of pleading, and makes extensive use of legal materials, cases and statutes, in both examples and exercises. Readers are also given strategies for handling major legal problems in standard logic, including ways for treating conditions contrary to fact, necessary and sufficient conditions, result within the risk, and intent. For logicians and philosophers of law.
This solidly written book explains the elements of contemporary symbolic logic, and examines the ways in which it illuminates the structure of legal reasoning and clarifies various legal problems.
This dissertation defends the use of nonmonotonic logic to represent rule-based legal reasoning, as exemplified by a particular, complex statute: the Internal Revenue Code. The dissertation motivates and provides a theoretical basis for formalizing the United States tax code (and perhaps other statutes). Formalization of statutory language will make statutes more precise. Formalized statutory language that tracks the actual structure of the tax law will make it easier for theoretical work to converge with the law, and may lay the groundwork to apply artificial intelligence to tax compliance and avoidance.To this end, the dissertation investigates and refines John Horty's work, especially Reasons as Defaults, with particular focus on examples in that book of inappropriate equilibria---scenarios that Horty's approach endorses that Horty finds problematic or unintuitive. The dissertation looks at Horty's work in service of applying Horty's work, and default logic more generally, to legal reasoning, and in particular rule-based legal reasoning.
This dissertation defends the use of nonmonotonic logic to represent rule-based legal reasoning, as exemplified by a particular, complex statute: the Internal Revenue Code.
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1917 edition. Excerpt: ...if the former be selected it will involve the defense of the "fellow servant rule," while if the latter, no such opposition is possible. Or if compelled to admit the negligence of the engineer he might still avert the "fellow servant rule" by advancing the theory that the engineer as a part of the equipment of the road was selected by the company without a due regard for his competency. Or again the theory may favor a breach of contract rather than a case of fraud, but the further element of doubt is whether the action will lie more successfully upon the ground of breach of the main contract or breach of warranty. Again, an action for damages for trespass to land may succeed if brought in one county, but fail if brought in another, while an action upon the same set of facts may be brought in one court, but not in another, where their jurisdiction is not concurrent. So also this question of detail would arise in an action brought to recover back money paid on a contract with a corporation, as to whether the theory of the case should hold the contract to be malum in se, malum prohibitum, or simply ultra vires. For in the former the court would refuse to grant a remedy, in the second the question of statute would be imperative, and in the latter the matter of notice might be determinate. In such a manner innumerable details affecting the various species of action are the final cruces upon which cases turn, and no theory is complete which stops with the selection of not only a possible, but the best species of action, but must add to this such particularity of detail as will insure a successful outcome. The Use of H yfiothcses. The theory of the case most likely to prove successful, having now been evolved by a process...
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1917 edition.
This book focuses on the analysis of law from a logical point of view, that is, on a tradition that is distinctively based on the application of logic as an indispensable device to endorse the scientific claims of legal thought. According to this approach, the obstacles that have prevented the development of law as a science can now be overcome with the use of modern mathematical logic as a formal science of thought. This formal science constitutes an essential tool for analyzing and systematizing the language of which law is made. Using mathematical logic makes it possible to clarify not only the structure of law, but also the structure of legal reasoning. This clarification is the basis for the operability of legal reasoning through computational devices, which constitutes the core of the artificial intelligence (AI) of law. The first part of this book aims to compare this model of legal science with the Kelsenian approach as well as with a model based on theories of knowledge representation found in the field of cognitive science. The second part of the present book deals with the problem of legal science's object from a logical approach.
This book focuses on the analysis of law from a logical point of view, that is, on a tradition that is distinctively based on the application of logic as an indispensable device to endorse the scientific claims of legal thought.
After a critical summary and analysis of syllogistic, inductive, and modern symbolic logic, this book undertakes a study of the concepts, symbolism, and applications of what has become known as deontic logic, or the logic of obligation, particularly as it relates to moral and legal reasoning involved in the making of decisions, choices, and the performance of human actions. The meanings of the terms 'act' and 'action' are thoroughly discussed as are the terms 'omission' and 'attempt'. Both dyadic and multi-valued versions of deontic logic and the insights of Lofti Zadeh's 'fuzzy logic' are referenced throughout the book, specifically in the chapter on the Logic of Jokes. The aesthetics and ethics of reasoning in mathematics, physical science, and law are discussed as well as the notion of commitment.
After a critical summary and analysis of syllogistic, inductive, and modern symbolic logic, this book undertakes a study of the concepts, symbolism, and applications of what has become known as deontic logic, or the logic of obligation, ...
