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Extending Deontic Logic for the Formalisation of Legal Rules

This book is an adaptation of my PhD thesis Representing L3gVI Rules in Deontic Logic [Royakkers, 1996]. The main alterations are: • The addition of chapter 2 concerning the semantics of deontic logic based on valua tions. In this chapter I extend the Beth tableau method, which is originally developed for the propositional calculus, to also be applicable for deontic logic. For those who are not familiar with deontic logic or with the axiomatic deduction, this method is a useful tool to check whether a formula is valid or not. • The addition of the notion of commitment in chapter 5, and the notion of weak and strong permission in chapter 7. • The omission of the chapter concerning defeasible deontic logic, of which a revised version is published in [Nute, 1997]. • Chapter 6 has been revised rather thoroughly. Here I introduce the logic of enact ment based on epistemic logic and local reasoning to express normative inconsis tencies in a consistent way. I wish to thank John-Jules Meyer, Giovanni Sartor and Marek Sergot for their suggestions and criticisms of my PhD thesis, which have improved this book. Heleen Neggers and Jan Draisma deserve credit for the layout. Special thanks go to Frank Dignum for his continuous support and inspiring sugges tions. v Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Logic and law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 1 . . . 1.2 Conflicting speed limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 3 . .

This book describes extensions of deontic logic.

Legal Reasoning and Briefing; Logic Applied to the Preparation, Trial and Appeal of Cases, with Illustrative Briefs and Forms

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1917 edition. Excerpt: ...if the former be selected it will involve the defense of the "fellow servant rule," while if the latter, no such opposition is possible. Or if compelled to admit the negligence of the engineer he might still avert the "fellow servant rule" by advancing the theory that the engineer as a part of the equipment of the road was selected by the company without a due regard for his competency. Or again the theory may favor a breach of contract rather than a case of fraud, but the further element of doubt is whether the action will lie more successfully upon the ground of breach of the main contract or breach of warranty. Again, an action for damages for trespass to land may succeed if brought in one county, but fail if brought in another, while an action upon the same set of facts may be brought in one court, but not in another, where their jurisdiction is not concurrent. So also this question of detail would arise in an action brought to recover back money paid on a contract with a corporation, as to whether the theory of the case should hold the contract to be malum in se, malum prohibitum, or simply ultra vires. For in the former the court would refuse to grant a remedy, in the second the question of statute would be imperative, and in the latter the matter of notice might be determinate. In such a manner innumerable details affecting the various species of action are the final cruces upon which cases turn, and no theory is complete which stops with the selection of not only a possible, but the best species of action, but must add to this such particularity of detail as will insure a successful outcome. The Use of H yfiothcses. The theory of the case most likely to prove successful, having now been evolved by a process...

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1917 edition.

Logic, Probability, and Presumptions in Legal Reasoning

At least since plato and Aristotle, thinkers have pondered the relationship between philosophical arguments and the "sophistical" arguments offered by the Sophists -- who were the first professional lawyers. Judges wield substantial political power, and the justifications they offer for their decisions are a vital means by which citizens can assess the legitimacy of how that power is exercised. However, to evaluate judicial justifications requires close attention to the method of reasoning behind decisions. This new collection illuminates and explains the political and moral importance in justifying the exercise of judicial power.

However, to evaluate judicial justifications requires close attention to the method of reasoning behind decisions. This new collection illuminates and explains the political and moral importance in justifying the exercise of judicial power.

Law and Logic - Making Legal Science a Genuine Science

Proceedings of the Special Workshop Held at the 28th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Lisbon, Portugal, 2017

This book focuses on the analysis of law from a logical point of view, that is, on a tradition that is distinctively based on the application of logic as an indispensable device to endorse the scientific claims of legal thought. According to this approach, the obstacles that have prevented the development of law as a science can now be overcome with the use of modern mathematical logic as a formal science of thought. This formal science constitutes an essential tool for analyzing and systematizing the language of which law is made. Using mathematical logic makes it possible to clarify not only the structure of law, but also the structure of legal reasoning. This clarification is the basis for the operability of legal reasoning through computational devices, which constitutes the core of the artificial intelligence (AI) of law. The first part of this book aims to compare this model of legal science with the Kelsenian approach as well as with a model based on theories of knowledge representation found in the field of cognitive science. The second part of the present book deals with the problem of legal science's object from a logical approach.

This book focuses on the analysis of law from a logical point of view, that is, on a tradition that is distinctively based on the application of logic as an indispensable device to endorse the scientific claims of legal thought.

Extending Deontic Logic for the Formalisation of Legal Rules

This book describes extensions of deontic logic. Deontic logic is a branch of philosophical logic involving reasoning with norms, obligations, prohibitions and permissions. The extensions concern the logical structure of legal rules and legal reasoning. Their function is to improve the representation of legal knowledge and enhance deontic logic through increased expressibility. The resulting formulas acquire new meanings, not expressible in standard deontic logic, which are subject to fresh interpretations. The author offers an extensive analysis of the representation of actors, to whom the norms are directed, and authorities who enact the norms. Moreover, a distinction is made between enactment and applicability. A modality of enactment can be used to express inconsistent enacted norms in a consistent way. An authority-hierarchy is introduced to filter out the applicable norms from the set of enacted norms. Some related philosophical questions will be discussed regarding the applications of formalisms that are intrinsic to practical science with respect to `consistency' and `universality'. The formalisms and applications considered here are relevant for law, philosophy and computer science, with a special focus on the improvement of legal expert systems and intelligent support for legal professionals.

This book describes extensions of deontic logic.

The Logic of Obligation, Choice, and Action

After a critical summary and analysis of syllogistic, inductive, and modern symbolic logic, this book undertakes a study of the concepts, symbolism, and applications of what has become known as deontic logic, or the logic of obligation, particularly as it relates to moral and legal reasoning involved in the making of decisions, choices, and the performance of human actions. The meanings of the terms 'act' and 'action' are thoroughly discussed as are the terms 'omission' and 'attempt'. Both dyadic and multi-valued versions of deontic logic and the insights of Lofti Zadeh's 'fuzzy logic' are referenced throughout the book, specifically in the chapter on the Logic of Jokes. The aesthetics and ethics of reasoning in mathematics, physical science, and law are discussed as well as the notion of commitment.

After a critical summary and analysis of syllogistic, inductive, and modern symbolic logic, this book undertakes a study of the concepts, symbolism, and applications of what has become known as deontic logic, or the logic of obligation, ...

Legal Logic: A Guide for Paralegals and Law Students

The substance of this book is derived from lectures presented to working paralegals as the first in a series of "foundation courses" intended to supplement their prior education and experience and to enhance their capacity to more competently handle tasks normally handled by lawyers. The course, and this book, is a condensed version of a full semester course in Aristotelian logic, tailored to the needs of people engaged in the analysis of legal issues, either as employee or as student. There are several primary objectives. the first is not to create logicians, but to foster the students' awareness of their own reasoning processes by discussing the importance of words, their definitions, uses and relationships, and to provide tools for testing whether conclusions are valid or invalid using formal (logical) analysis. The second broader objective is to provide a foundation for further study and use of the principles of effective communication and interpretation of communication. Another more specific objective is to show the use of the tools of logic in a legal context, particularly the formal analysis of case law. About the author: The author has practiced law since 1967. During his tenure as Counsel with a major financial services corporation, he was responsible for its law department's paralegals and paralegal development program. Those duties led him to develop the three foundation courses that are now available in book and digital form: Legal Logic, Legal Promise, and Legal Method.

The substance of this book is derived from lectures presented to working paralegals as the first in a series of "foundation courses" intended to supplement their prior education and experience and to enhance their capacity to more ...

The Logic of Autonomy

Law, Morality and Autonomous Reasoning

Autonomy is the central idea of modern practical philosophy. Understood as self-legislation, autonomy seems to require that the validity of norms depends on recognition, namely, that their addressees, being autonomous agents, recognise these norms to be valid. But how can one be bound by norms whose validity depends on their being recognised as valid by their addressees? The questions of how autonomous morality and, on this basis, the authoritative character of law can be understood, present persistent puzzles that have been widely discussed, but still await a satisfactory solution. This book presents an analysis of the idea of autonomy as self-legislation and its consequences for law and morality. It links the idea of autonomy with the idea of the balancing of normative arguments, develops a notion of normative arguments as distinct from normative judgements and statements and explains claims to correctness and objectivity that are found in normative discourse. Thus, a 'logic of autonomy' emerges, and it is pervasive in normative reasoning. It connects theses regarding the logic of norms, the structure of balancing, human and fundamental rights, legal validity, legal interpretation, and the relations among legal systems, offering a theory of central elements of normative argumentation, a theory that is undergirded by the mutual relations that exist between and among its parts as well as through the relations that it bears to other theories. Moreover, it offers an alternative to Kantian notions of autonomy and provides solutions to problems that other theories have failed to master.

This book presents an analysis of the idea of autonomy as self-legislation and its consequences for law and morality.